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Chapter 11
From concession bargaining to broad 
workplace solidarity: the IG Metall response 
to agency work
Chiara Benassi
1. International competition and company-level 
concessions
Market integration at a global level has opened new opportunities for 
companies to expand into new markets and to shift their production 
abroad, leading to growing international competition (Buckley and 
Ghauri 2004; Rees and Edwards 2010). The resulting pressure on costs 
has affected the dynamics of collective bargaining, especially in export-
oriented manufacturing companies in Europe and other highly devel-
oped countries where labour bargaining power has increasingly come 
under pressure (Tilly 1995; Raess 2006; Greer and Hauptmeier 2008). 
Leeway for bargaining high salaries and good working conditions has 
inevitably declined as a result of employers’ focus on cutting labour costs 
to improve company competitiveness in international markets (Sisson 
et al. 2003; Anner et al. 2006). Moreover the public discourse is put-
ting further pressure on labour’s attempts to resist the deterioration of 
workers’ standards (Piotti 2009). Unions have been publicly accused of 
endangering the jobs that companies threatened to outsource if condi-
tions for improving a plant’s fl exibility and cost competitiveness were 
not met. For instance, the German metal union IG Metall was portrayed 
as a ‘job killer’ when it initially rejected a management proposal to cre-
ate 5,000 new jobs at lower wages and working conditions than those 
enjoyed by the existing workforce (Greer and Hauptmeier forthcoming). 
Similarly, the Italian metal union FIOM was accused of being too ‘ideo-
logical’ when it refused to sign agreements reducing breaks and increas-
ing overtime without compensation for the whole workforce at the FIAT 
plants in Pomigliano and Mirafi ori in 2010 (La Repubblica 2010). 
As a result of this pressure to improve competitiveness, bargaining con-
cessions have been spreading across Europe. Under the threat of closing 
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down plants or outsourcing production units, labour representatives 
have agreed to lower standards for wages and working conditions in or-
der to save production sites (Hancké 2000; Pulignano 2006; Greer and 
Hauptmeier 2008; Greer and Hauptmeier forthcoming). Typically, the 
core workforce has taken pay cuts or accepted working time reductions 
or overtime without compensation as in the cases of Opel in Germany 
(Schulten 1998), PSA Peugeot-Citroën in France (Turlan 2012) and 
SEAT in Spain (Albarracín 2005). However, concession bargaining has 
not only affected the working conditions of the core workforce, as labour 
representatives have also agreed to concessions at the expense of new 
hires or the peripheral workforce. Such concessions included the dual-
tier wage systems for new hires at VW in Wolfsburg in the early 2000s 
(Dribbusch 2004) and at the US auto suppliers Delphi and Visteon 
(Slaughter 2003); the outsourcing of (generally lower-end) production 
units to subcontractors without collective agreements as in the German 
automotive, chemical and telecom industries (Doellgast and Greer 2007; 
Helfen 2011) and the employment of a cheap and fl exible workforce in 
the German and Korean automotive industry (Jürgens and Krzywdzin-
ski 2006; Yun 2011; Benassi 2013). 
This chapter will focus on concessions on the use of peripheral workers, 
examining in detail labour strategies towards agency workers at compa-
ny and sectoral level in the German metal sector. It has been argued that 
these concessions constitute an instrument protecting the standards of 
the core workforce against increasing competitive pressure. Through 
agreements at the expense of the peripheral workforce unions have, on 
the one hand, managed to maintain their bargaining power over the 
standards of their core members; on the other hand, they have also con-
tributed to the dualization of labour markets (Lehndorff 2012; Hassel 
2014; Eichhorst 2015). However, the fi ndings presented in this chapter 
suggest that these concessions backfi re on the core workforce in the long 
run because the increasing presence of a cheap and fl exible workforce 
at company level threatens collectively agreed standards and the future 
existence of a permanent workforce. German unions have thus recently 
started resisting employers’ segmentation strategies, often justifi ed by 
reference to international competition pressure, and have instead adopt-
ed inclusive strategies towards the peripheral workforce. In particular, 
this chapter looks at the campaign IG Metall launched in 2008 to recruit 
agency workers and bargain on their behalf. 
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This chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
relevance of studying the German case from a research and policy per-
spective. The third section illustrates the spread of concession bargain-
ing on agency work in Germany and its consequences for labour bar-
gaining power. The fourth and fi fth sections illustrate the response of 
IG Metall and the works councils to the growth of contingent work. The 
empirical evidence is mainly based on the analysis of union reports and 
documents and on fi eldwork conducted in the German metal sector be-
tween 2011 and 2013, which included interviews with human resource 
managers and labour representatives. The last section summarizes the 
fi ndings and draws conclusions for labour strategies. 
2. The relevance of the German case 
The German metal sector represents a particularly relevant case for 
studying the spread of concession bargaining at the expense of the pe-
ripheral workforce. First, works councils and unions in the sector benefi t 
from an institutionalized bargaining position and from the most devel-
oped codetermination rights at workplace level in Europe. Neverthe-
less, German labour representatives were not fully able to counteract 
the spread of concessions despite such formally strong bargaining in-
stitutions (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011). This phenomenon reveals the 
great pressure on industrial relations in Europe stemming from neolib-
eral policies and international competition. 
Second, the IG Metall campaign for agency workers shows that tradi-
tional collective bargaining institutions need to be re-interpreted and 
revitalized in the face of new challenges and under the pressure of em-
ployers’ casualization strategies (Greer 2008; Turner 2009; Benassi 
and Dorigatti 2014). The case of the German metal sector suggests that 
concession bargaining at the expense of the peripheral workforce erodes 
overall labour bargaining power in the long run despite the continuing 
existence of formal institutions. 
Third, the growth of contingent work in the German metal sector and 
the resulting union reaction have shown that the competitiveness of the 
internationally acclaimed German export model has up to now depend-
ed on labour concessions increasing inequality within the workforce 
(Lehndorff 2012; Baccaro and Benassi 2014). These fi ndings raise some 
scepticism about the recent proposals to export the ‘new’ German model 
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of industrial relations, especially decentralized bargaining, to Southern 
European countries in order to improve their economic performance 
(Anderton et al. 2012; Dustmann et al. 2014). 
3.  The German case: eroding labour power through 
company-level pacts for competitiveness
3.1  Seeking competitiveness in a fragmented industrial 
relations landscape 
The German economy has always relied on its export-oriented manufac-
turing sector. Research in the eighties and early nineties showed that la-
bour costs were partly protected from international market competition 
thanks to German companies being specialized in upper-end market 
segments (Sorge and Streeck 1987; Streeck 1991). Since the mid-nine-
ties, however, employers have increasingly focused on reducing labour 
costs in the face of upcoming competitors – such as US and Japanese 
manufacturers – starting to produce for high quality markets at lower 
prices than German companies thanks to the adoption of new technolo-
gies and lean management strategies (Herrigel 1997; Jürgens 2004; 
Herrigel 2014). 
In response to the cost pressure, German employers heavily restructured 
manufacturing production, especially with regard to integrating the value 
chain. Production was organized into modules which could be performed 
outside the core company by subcontractors (Jürgens 2004; Doellgast 
and Greer 2007; Greer 2008); or even outsourced to cheaper production 
sites, particularly in Eastern Europe (Kinkel and Lay 2003; Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski 2006). Indeed, the Fraunhofer Institute reports that over 
40 per cent of companies in core manufacturing sectors outsourced part 
of their production abroad between 1999 and 2001, mainly with the aim 
of reducing production costs (Kinkel and Lay 2003: 4). 
These trends led to a public debate on the future of Germany as a pro-
duction location (Standortdebatte), contributing to a consensus on the 
necessity to cut labour costs in order to re-gain competitiveness and 
helping legitimize the introduction of opening clauses at workplace level 
(Upchurch 2000: 76; Silvia 2010: 223). In this context works councils 
were made co-responsible for maintaining the investments in their plant 
and pushed to sign workplace agreements amending sectoral standards. 
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These so-called Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness (PECs) 
quickly spread across sectors and soon became an institutionalized in-
strument for co-management (Hassel and Rehder 2001; Rehder 2003). 
These workplace agreements mainly included concessions on wages, 
working time and other working conditions, and the use of temporary 
work and subcontractors (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2006; Haipeter 
2011). 
3.2  The consequences of concessions at the expense of the 
peripheral workforce1  
Since the mid-nineties use of contingent work and subcontractors has 
spread under the tacit consensus of works councils attempting to use 
temporary workers as a cheap fl exibility buffer, while protecting the 
standards of the core workforce from competitive pressure. A survey 
conducted among works councillors for an IG Metall internal research 
project in Berlin-Brandenburg-Saxony reported that the vast majority 
of the interviewed works councillors saw agency workers as an instru-
ment for protecting the standards of the core workforce (IG Metall study 
reported in Aust et al. 2007: 263). In a similar survey conducted among 
works councillors in the metal sector, 43% of the them agreed on us-
ing agency work as a fl exibility buffer and only one out of three pur-
sued equal pay and equal treatment as bargaining aims (Wassermann 
and Rudolph 2007: 15–24). As a result, provisions for agency workers 
in company-level agreements tended to shift costs from core to agency 
workers, boosting workforce segmentation in terms of working time (for 
example, overtime and unsocial working hours) and pay (for example, no 
access to company-level bonuses and benefi ts) (Zumbeck 2009: 15–40). 
The attitude of works councils and unions towards agency workers start-
ed changing a few years after the implementation of the Hartz reforms 
which deregulated the use of agency work. These lifted most limitations 
on the use of agency work: companies could hire workers on agency con-
tracts without specifying the reason for the fi xed term and without offer-
ing any guarantee of a permanent job afterwards. Dismissal protection 
was lowered as agencies could employ workers on contracts lasting only 
1. This section relies on the article published in the British Journal of Industrial Relations by 
Benassi and Dorigatti (2014).
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until the end of their assignment at the hiring company. The equal pay 
principle, though existing in law, could be amended by collective agree-
ment (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2011). Due to unfair competition from 
the Christian union (whose collective agreements were declared unlaw-
ful by the labour court in 2013), the DGB special bargaining body for 
agency workers signed a collective agreement setting wages at a much 
lower level than in the metal sector. 
In 2011 the German government changed existing legislation to comply 
with the Directive on Agency Work, approved by the European Parlia-
ment in 2008. The resulting legislation introduced a minimum wage for 
agency workers in order to limit potential wage dumping due to the in-
fl ow of migrant workers from Eastern Europe after the barriers to the 
German labour market fell in 2011. However, the amended law still al-
lows exceptions to the equal pay principle through collective agreements. 
Furthermore, it does not regulate the transition from an agency contract 
to a permanent position, stating simply that agency workers should be 
employed only temporarily (vorübergehend). Unfortunately, this vague 
term can be loosely interpreted by employers (Frankfurter Rundschau 
2013; IG Metall 2011). 
Against this deregulation background, employers’ use of agency work 
increased dramatically – Baccaro and Benassi (2014) used IAB data to 
calculate that in 1996 agency workers constituted, on average, 2% of the 
workforce in 45% of companies in core manufacturing sectors. In 2008, 
however, over 90% of these companies employed an average of 8% of 
their workforce on agency contracts (p. 361), with peaks of even 20–30% 
in big manufacturing companies (Bellmann and Kuehl 2007; Holst et al. 
2009; Benassi 2013). 
Because of this change in employers’ casualization strategies, IG Met-
all started perceiving agency work as an attempt of ‘conscious creation 
of cheap workforce’ (IG Metall 2007: 23 cit. in Benassi and Dorigatti 
2014) with the potential to threaten the standards of the core workforce 
in the long run. The interviews conducted with union representatives 
and works councillors and the analysis of IG Metall reports (IG Met-
all 2007, 2009) suggest that the performance of core workers is often 
benchmarked against agency workers who tend to work harder and at a 
faster pace because they want to be hired permanently. At the same time, 
however, they are cheaper and therefore their presence allows employers 
to question the existing standards of the core workforce. Furthermore, 
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the increasing presence of agency workers limits labour mobilization 
strength: fi rst because core workers are afraid of being substituted; and 
secondly because it is diffi cult to organize agency workers to go on strike. 
Finally, the intensive use of agency work reduces the overall impact of 
strikes as it can prevent production from stopping. This happened for 
instance in the Lower Saxony machine tool manufacturing plant of Atlas 
where the company used agency workers to maintain production dur-
ing strikes. IG Metall managed to stop this practice in 2010 (IG Metall 
2010). 
4. Extending solidarity to regain bargaining power
Until the mid-2000s IG Metall unsuccessfully tried to organize workers 
within their staff agencies (Weinkopf and Vanselow 2008: 26), leaving 
the regulation of agency work to the bargaining abilities of company-
level works councils and avoiding any direct intervention. This strategy, 
however, proved to be detrimental because works councils agreed to the 
use of a cheap peripheral workforce under pressure to cut labour costs 
(Benassi and Dorigatti 2014: 12). 
The ‘Same Work, Same Wage’ campaign started in 2008 as a response 
to the dramatic growth of agency work following the Hartz reforms. Its 
goal was to unionize agency workers and to set homogenous and fair 
standards for them at sectoral level. To this aim, it included initiatives 
both at company and sectoral level, supported by a campaign targeting 
national media. 
The media campaign was oriented both towards the members of the la-
bour organization and the wider public. First, it made union representa-
tives and works councils aware that regulating agency work was a prior-
ity for the union and had to be included in the bargaining goals of both 
works councils and union offi cials. Furthermore, an interviewed IG Met-
all offi cial from Berlin-Brandenburg suggested that the public shaming 
of employers’ casualization strategies helped works councils to discuss 
more openly their ambiguous attitude towards the peripheral workforce, 
as they could denounce the heavy pressure on cutting labour costs they 
were exposed to. 
Second, the campaign wanted to raise awareness in the public at large 
towards the working conditions of agency workers in order to increase 
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unions’ leverage in the coming bargaining rounds and to lobby politicians 
to improve legal regulation. It presented agency work as a new employer 
instrument for exploiting workers, with potential negative consequences 
for German society in general in the long run. The campaign included a 
truck that toured different German cities, postcards and e-cards which 
could be sent to members of local and national parliaments to lobby for 
better regulation of agency work, and several billboards highlighting the 
gap in wages and working conditions between agency workers and regu-
lar employees. Furthermore, IG Metall produced leafl ets and brochures 
in which works councillors and the workers themselves reported on their 
direct experiences with agency work. 
At company level, IG Metall tried to change how works councils under-
stood and performed their workplace representation mandate. It pro-
vided specifi c training workshops for works councils to raise their aware-
ness of the issue of agency work and provide them with information on 
the legal framework of agency work and their codetermination rights in 
this regard. Through the seminars and media campaign works councils 
were also encouraged to actively engage in the issue of agency work at 
company level. Furthermore, IG Metall started intervening in support 
of works councils in diffi cult bargaining rounds on agency work. These 
interventions were usually linked to the sectoral campaign in order to 
increase pressure on management. For example, the works council of 
the BMW plant in Munich requested the support of IG Metall during the 
company-level negotiations on equal pay because management was re-
fusing to reach an agreement. The local IG Metall threatened to position 
a truck with a sign reading ‘BMW-Temple of Slave Labour’ in front of 
BMW Welt, the company’s museum. Afraid of the potential damaging ef-
fect this initiative could have on BMW’s reputation, management agreed 
to pay agency workers in accordance with the metal agreement (Benassi 
2013). Similarly, IG Metall support helped the Siemens general works 
council to successfully re-establish equal pay for agency workers in 2012 
after the company had announced its intention to withdraw its com-
mitment, for example, by organizing protests outside Siemens plants in 
Frankfurt (IG Metall 2012a). 
At sectoral level, IG Metall focused on recruiting agency workers. As part 
of the campaign it stressed the advantages of joining the union, includ-
ing fi nancial support in case of accidents and legal counselling, avail-
able also through a hotline set up specifi cally for agency workers. Above 
all, IG Metall included the issue of agency work in the metal bargaining 
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rounds. First, IG Metall advocated equal pay for agency workers so that 
companies in the metal sector would pay agency workers in accordance 
with the metal agreement rather than the agreement reached between 
the DGB bargaining body and the associations of staff agencies. Second, 
IG Metall pushed for limiting the contract duration of agency work-
ers, who were to be guaranteed permanent hiring after a certain period 
of time. Third, IG Metall advocated the expansion of codetermination 
rights to cover the use of agency work. 
5. The outcomes of the campaign
The outcomes of the campaign were positive. At company level works 
councils actively worked to achieve agreements gaining better working 
conditions for agency workers – by 2011, over 1,200 companies were 
covered (IG Metall 2012c). Moreover, the works councils interviewed 
during the fi eldwork had all managed to achieve agreements improving 
the wage levels and working conditions of agency workers, even though 
there were differences in the extent and coverage across plants. The Ford 
plant in Cologne was the plant with the most wide-reaching agreement 
as it included quotas, equal pay and specifi c rules regarding transition 
from a temporary to a permanent contract. As argued elsewhere (see Be-
nassi 2013), the Ford works council was able to achieve this result pri-
marily because bargaining took place in early 2003, i.e. before the Hartz 
reforms deregulating the use of agency work came into force. The other 
plants, by contrast, only managed to regulate agency work several years 
after the Hartz reforms, also thanks to the IG Metall campaign. 
The threat of outsourcing to Eastern Europe played a major role at the 
BMW plant in Leipzig, which had the highest rate of agency workers 
(around 30%). In this plant, the works councillor interviewed consid-
ered the concessions on the use of contingent workers and subcontrac-
tors inevitable as they constituted a pre-condition for setting up the plant 
in Germany rather than in cheaper production sites in Eastern Europe. 
Moreover, the BMW labour representative in Munich suggested that 
works council concessions on labour standards might affect relocation 
decisions; at the same time, however, he believed that these decisions 
were also ‘about politics’ rather than exclusively effi ciency calculations. 
The works councillors at VW in Wolfsburg and at Ford in Cologne were 
even more confi dent that the use of agency work and the following re-
regulation would not impact employers’ relocation plans. While the VW 
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works councillor believed that the Wolfsburg plant was not in any im-
mediate danger of relocation at the time of the interview (maybe because 
of the political and strategic importance of the Wolfsburg headquarters), 
the Ford works councillor was sceptical about the council’s ability to in-
fl uence managerial decisions in this respect: 
‘Management has always said that the plant is in danger, that business 
units need to be outsourced…Whether they do it or don’t, whether 
they outsource, is not something we need to think too much about. If 
a company has taken the strategic decision to set up plants in Eastern 
Europe or Asia, they’ll do it. […] This is why I’ve never been particu-
larly impressed by this management rhetoric.’ (Ford works council-
lor, 19.04.2012 cit. in Benassi 2013: 24)
In the plants in Cologne, Munich and Wolfsburg, the works councillors 
mainly highlighted the importance of concessions on internal fl exibility 
(for example, the use of working time accounts in times of low demand) 
because the cooperation and technical skills of works councils consti-
tuted a source of comparative advantage for the company in compari-
son to other production sites abroad. At the same time, however, they 
suggested that employers were taking advantage of the lack of regula-
tion of contingent work and of works council weakness in counteracting 
managerial decisions because they were more ‘blackmailable’ than the 
union which was able to represent workers’ interests as an independent 
political actor. Therefore, they welcomed the initiative of IG Metall to 
re-establish sectoral regulation of agency work and standards of wages 
and working conditions. 
At sectoral level, IG Metall achieved major recruiting gains, with over 
50,000 agency workers joining the union by 2012 (IG Metall 2012c). It 
also achieved important contractual results: In the steel sector an in-
dustry-wide agreement on equal pay for agency workers was achieved 
in September 2010. In May 2012 the new collective agreement for the 
metal and electronics industry was signed. This strengthened co-deter-
mination rights in the hiring companies, as works councils were now 
able to bargain with management over the justifi cation of hiring agency 
workers and their period of assignment. Moreover, it set rules ensuring 
that agency workers were hired permanently after a certain period of 
time: it is encouraged after 18 months of continuous assignment and be-
comes compulsory after 24 months. In the same year IG Metall negotiat-
ed an agreement with the employer associations of staff agencies setting 
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wage bonuses for agency workers, with the aim of reducing the wage gap 
between agency workers and permanent workers. 15% additional wag-
es were to be paid after six weeks of continuous assignment, gradually 
increasing to 50% after nine months (IG Metall 2012b). Furthermore, 
IG Metall negotiated the new collective agreement in the agency sector 
together with the other sectoral DGB unions, which set a sectoral mini-
mum wage of 8.50€/h and a 9.6% increase in wage levels in Western 
Germany and 12.8% in Eastern Germany (IG Metall 2013). 
6.  Conclusion: the need to focus on fairness 
and solidarity 
In Germany concession bargaining spread as a consequence of increas-
ing international competition and the weakening of sectoral bargaining 
structures. In this hostile context, works councils initially tried to pro-
tect, at least to a certain extent, the standards of the core workforce by al-
lowing management to employ increasing shares of contingent workers. 
These workers are usually employed at lower wage rates and constitute a 
convenient fl exibility buffer for the company because they can be easily 
dismissed. However, this bargaining strategy did not prove to be effec-
tive and sustainable in the long run in protecting the jobs of core work-
ers from outsourcing or cost-cutting, especially in a context of labour 
market deregulation. Indeed, both works councils and unions reported 
that the increasing presence of a cheap workforce was slowly eroding 
collectively agreed standards and labour’s bargaining power, contribut-
ing to a downward spiral which the concessions had originally aimed to 
avoid. For this reason, IG Metall started including agency workers in its 
bargaining scope and offering support to works councils in an attempt to 
avert employer pressure for concessions. 
Even though these fi ndings rely solely on the German metal sector, they 
provide important lessons for labour in other countries. Increasing pres-
sure on workplace employment relations is a phenomenon affecting all 
European countries (Keune 2011; Marginson 2015). Similarly, labour 
market reforms have all focused on improving labour market fl exibility 
in the last twenty years, meaning that contingent workers are increas-
ingly employed across skill levels and occupations (Rhodes 1997; Gebel 
and Giesecke 2011; Marx 2011). To overcome these challenges, unions 
need to open their representation domain to new workforce groups, as a 
united labour front is of fundamental importance for reducing workforce 
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inequality. Besides the case of IG Metall, this is confi rmed by recent 
empirical research comparing workers’ outcomes in the telecom sector 
across different European countries, which found that labour can play 
a fundamental role in reducing workforce inequality under cost-cutting 
pressure when it manages to adopt encompassing bargaining strategies 
(Doellgast et al. 2015; Benassi et al. 2015). Furthermore, bargaining 
strategies focused solely on maintaining standards for the core work-
force were found to be unsuccessful in the long run, leading to an overall 
decline in wages and working conditions (Doellgast et al. 2015). 
The fi ndings therefore suggest that concessions at the expense of the 
peripheral workforce represent only a short-term response to the chal-
lenges posed by the increasing pressure on workers’ representation and 
collective bargaining. Though it has been argued that concessions on 
working time and wages might contribute, in the short run, to prevent-
ing plant relocations or closures – even though the evidence is mixed 
on the effectiveness of such concessions (Massa-Wirth and Seifert 2005; 
Chaison 2012) –, in the long run, however, they lead to deteriorating 
working conditions for the whole workforce (Pulignano 2014; Doellgast 
et al. 2015; Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2008), and therefore do not rep-
resent a sustainable strategy. 
The key strategy to prevent concession bargaining seems to be to reverse 
the process of bargaining decentralisation, which allows employers to 
negotiate wages and working conditions both for permanent and tem-
porary workers at workplace level, where labour is weaker. First, the 
labour movement should try to shift labour-management confl ict from 
the workplace level to the sectoral and national level, as witnessed by IG 
Metall which engaged in sectoral bargaining on behalf of agency workers 
in order to re-establish a common bargaining fl oor for works councils. 
The campaign also made strategic use of the media, exposing employers’ 
casualization strategies to public discussion. By publicly shaming these 
practices, IG Metall put pressure on employers: the campaign helped re-
frame the public discourse on fl exibility, previously solely focused on the 
necessity of improving the competitiveness of Standort Deutschland.2 
The campaign refocused public attention on the issue of fairness at work 
and of employers’ responsibility for negative societal outcomes such as 
2. Germany as a production location.
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increasing inequality. Both the union’s bargaining efforts and its active 
intervention in the public discourse were of fundamental importance in 
taking the pressure off works councils to maintain plant competitive-
ness, allowing them to resist employers’ segmentation strategies. 
Second, international, and particularly European, workers’ representa-
tion bodies should play a more active role in setting common interna-
tional standards, in particular regarding the regulation of contingent 
work, as workplace concessions (on external fl exibility) are closely 
linked to increasing international competition and transnational com-
panies’ strategies (Pulignano 2014, 2015). Of the automotive plants 
involved in the study, only Volkswagen’s International Works Council 
and European Works Council managed to negotiate with corporate man-
agement the conclusion of the ‘Charta of Agency Work’. Its provisions 
on wages, training and the transition to permanent contracts apply to 
agency workers in all VW Group plants worldwide (IndustriAll 2012). 
The agreement will hopefully pave the way for further cross-national 
regulation at company level or even at sectoral level, helping to prevent 
the spread of concessions at the expense of the peripheral workforce by 
removing labour costs from competition. 
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